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In the case of the air-launched weapons, the aircraft is just a truck neither the aircraft nor the pilot has any role in guiding the weapon to the target after release. The second critical mission-to hold targets at risk-seems to apply to stationary targets which are to be engaged with by stand-off precision attack. defense budget we can envision these days. Even against mobile targets in Iran, the number of platforms required to observe, identify, target, and hit a mobile system in less than 10 minutes is very large-well beyond any U.S. Or do we assume the Chinese will be polite enough only to launch at night when they have to rely on their steadily increasing ability to see stealth platforms? In short, the idea a manned stealth platform is necessary to deal with mobile targets in China defies logic. Proponents have never been clear how a large manned bomber will survive while orbiting in daylight in heavily defended Chinese airspace. China has a sophisticated, integrated air-defense system. To “contend” with this set of mobile targets, the United States would have to maintain enough aircraft in the contested airspace of China to detect, classify, and attack a missile system anywhere within thousands of square miles of complex terrain in a matter of minutes. The vehicle has to appear only a few minutes before actual launch. Solid-fueled systems can be hidden in garages, camouflaged as commercial vehicles, or even simply parked under tents and prepared to fire. Third, the terrain in China is much more complex. Second, the range of these systems is greater and thus the launch sites can be spread over a much greater geographic region. First, the Chinese systems are solid–fueled so can be erected and launched in under 10 minutes.
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Hunting mobile systems in China presents a much more complex problem than hunting Scuds in Iraq.
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While technology has advanced greatly in the last 20 years, hunting mobile missiles remains a time/distance problem. Despite all these advantages, the Gulf War Air Power Survey concluded, “There is no indisputable proof that Scud mobile launchers-as opposed to high-fidelity decoys, trucks or other objects with Scud-like signature-were destroyed by fixed-wing aircraft.” They failed to get a single confirmed kill despite the fact it took 30 minutes to erect, fuel, and launch a liquid-fueled Scud. In addition, Allied forces had absolute air supremacy as well as hundreds of aircraft that could range freely over the entire country. However, the British Special Air Services reported that actual launches could be seen by ground observers from 30 miles away. The author noted that the commercial vehicles on the highways provided significant background clutter that made the Scuds hard to target. According to a RAND’s Special Operations Force and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets, the coalition air forces saw 42 Scud launches but could only get into position to drop ordnance eight times. We need only look back to Operation Desert Storm to see why. The idea that a manned aircraft will be able to strike mobile targets is deeply flawed. Proponents argue that the United States must be able to “ contend with more mobile sets of targets,” “ hold targets at risk,” and finally, “to hit hardened and deeply buried targets.” Let’s consider each in turn. It is less clear that this capability requires a manned aircraft. The requirement for a long-range strike capability in the era of increasingly effective anti-access weapons systems is clear. Robert Martinage recently proposed the Pentagon “ accelerate development and expand procurement of the LRS-B” and add the mission of “stand-off precision attack” to the bomber’s capabilities.īefore we jump on the bandwagon of the LRS-B, we should consider its ability to execute the planned missions, its procurement timeline, its cost, and then potential alternatives. They state this effort is essential to ensure the United States can pursue more mobile targets deep in Chinese or Iranian territory. Randy Forbes and Chris Stewart argued that Congress must push for rapid development of the Air Force LRS-B. Writing in The National Interest, Representatives J. Unfortunately, to date, the vast majority of those who are speaking have already decided that the solution is a new manned aircraft-in particular the proposed Air Force Long Range Strike-Bomber (LRS-B). Political leaders in the United States need to start a serious conversation about alternatives for new long-range strike capability.